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For Vicedo, ‘putting attachment in its place’ seems to entail two aspects.
The ﬁrst is working to understand the rise of attachment theory and its
place within the history of knowledge practices. The second is to criticize
the validity of attachment theory. In this reply, we appraise three criti-
cisms made by Vicedo of attachment theory, chosen as points for
sustaining a dialogue. Our main point in this reply is that, in excluding
the work of attachment researchers after Ainsworth from consideration,
Vicedo’s work is not yet able to properly ‘put attachment in its place’, in
either sense of the phrase. At most, she puts Bowlby in the 1950s–1960s
in his place, but without speaking eﬀectively to subsequent attachment
research. In our view, not just the validity, but the very meaning of
attachment as a scientiﬁc research programme cannot be understood
outside of its temporal context, and the relationship this entails between
theory and research, past and future.
1. History and attachment research
In The Nature and Nurture of Love, Vicedo states that ‘the scientiﬁc evidence
in support of attachment theory has been insuﬃcient and is deeply ﬂawed’
(2013, p. 238), a position that Vicedo continues to argue in ‘Putting
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attachment in its place’. We agree that it is an appropriate part of the role of
a historian of science to appraise the evidence under discussion. However,
issues as well as insights may arise when a historian treats evidence of the
contingent, social and messy origins of ideas as evidence of their lack of
scientiﬁc validity. This is to miss the distinction, always relative but none-
theless often meaningful, between the generation of ideas and the slow
nature of work to appraise their validity (cf. Schickore & Steinle, 2006). We
fully acknowledge that most of Bowlby’s ideas were not well-grounded in
adequate supporting evidence, were inﬂuenced by contemporary ideolo-
gies, and that caution is needed in using those that have not seen adequate
testing. This is often the case with the development of early theories across
the sciences (Collins, 2004).
Furthermore, some of Bowlby’s hypotheses have been very valu-
able, producing knowledge that is reliable and a good basis for the
design of policies such as family rooming-in during a child’s hospi-
talization. He was also right to contest the overemphasis on fantasy
at the expense of the actuality of child experiences in the psycho-
analytic thought of his day. He was absolutely right that child
institutionalization is generally harmful and emotionally damaging
(Dozier et al., 2014; Lionetti, Pastore, & Barone, 2015) although
convincing empirical evidence was lacking 70 years ago (Bowlby,
1953). However, Bowlby was also wrong on many accounts, and
Vicedo appropriately points to occasions where he expressed
undue and unwarranted conﬁdence in certain claims with potentially
damaging social eﬀects. One area where later research has rectiﬁed
early theory has been in relation to daycare. Bowlby underestimated
the role of child factors in the experience of daycare; researchers
have found that infants with a prior tendency to be more readily
upset appear to be more aﬀected by the quality of care they
experience – both negatively and positively – than other children
(Pluess & Belsky, 2009). Bowlby’s thinking also radically underspeci-
ﬁed the concepts of ‘separation’ and ‘deprivation’. As a consequence
he was wrong that daycare is an experience of a similar kind as
institutionalization, although his emphasis on continuity and sensi-
tivity of care turned out empirically to be important factors for
quality daycare. Longitudinal research following 1,153 children
from infancy to adolescence found that quality day-care for young
children whose mothers are highly stressed confers a net beneﬁt
(NICHD, 1997).
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2. Continuities or discontinuities across generations of
researchers
The tendency in Vicedo’s writings to assume uncomplicated continuity
from attachment research from the mid-1950s to the present has been
criticized by both historians and psychologists. Midgley (2014, p. 266)
describes Vicedo’s account of attachment theory as ‘polemical’ since it
seems to wish to debunk attachment research, but displays ‘lack of
attention to the work of Mary Main and others in the last forty years’,
and is therefore tellingly ‘outdated’, without purchase on the present
(268). In her paper on ‘Putting attachment in its place’, as well as in
her other work that we have seen, Vicedo excludes mention of sub-
sequent developments in attachment theory by Ainsworth’s students,
or their students. Vicedo makes no mention of the cross-cultural work
that attachment researchers have conducted. And she makes no cita-
tion of the ﬁeld’s journal Attachment & Human Development or the
ﬁeld’s compendium, the Handbook of Attachment (now in its third
edition; e.g. Mesman, van IJzendoorn, & Sagi-Schwartz, 2016). Other
commentators have similarly observed that Vicedo’s criticisms do not
strike home because she conﬂates Bowlby with attachment theory and
research, and underplays developments in Bowlby’s thinking across
time. Vicedo does not acknowledge that ‘one can jettison the idea of
mother love as instinctual, as well as the ﬁxation on the mother as the
crucial attachment ﬁgure, without discarding all of the theory’s
insights’ (Plant, 2015, p. 459). The idea of mother love as instinctual
was an early formulation especially to be found in Bowlby’s Child Care
and the Growth of Love (1953). Yet at least from 1964 (see PP/Bow/
H.147), whilst there may be a short period where one or another
caregiver is preferred when an infant is distressed, for Bowlby the
attachment system was conceptualized as organized by the expecta-
tion that distributed caregiving may be available, and attachments
made to various caregivers. Bowlby’s last published work explicitly
states the attachment system ‘contributes to the individual’s survival
by keeping him or her in touch with one or more caregivers.’ (1991,
p. 306). Bowlby (1969, p. 303) wrote ‘it has sometimes been alleged
that I have expressed the view . . . that mothering “cannot be safely
distributed among several ﬁgures” (Mead, 1962). No such views have
been expressed by me.’ Vicedo’s inclusion of Mead’s allegation in
‘Putting attachment in its place’, but not Bowlby’s direct reply to it,
suggests partiality.
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Later generations of attachment researchers have not held mother
love to be instinctual, nor have they regarded it as necessary that the
mother would be a child’s sole attachment ﬁgure. The work of Sarah
Hrdy (e.g. 2009) is an important contemporary inﬂuence in this regard. It
is true, as Vicedo states, that siblings as caregivers have not yet received
adequate attention in attachment research (but see the recent paper on
infant–mother and infant–sibling attachment in Zambia by Mooya,
Sichimba, & Bakermans-Kranenburg, 2016). For decades now, Bowlby’s
ideas have been elaborated in generating testable hypotheses on the
development of attachment in social networks (e.g. Goossens &
Ijzendoorn, 1990). In ‘Putting attachment in its place’ Vicedo states
that the bulk of attachment research ‘has focused on testing a single
variable (security), and has appealed to a single explanatory factor
(maternal sensitivity)’ (692). However this has not been true for many
decades as various meta-analyses document (e.g., Cyr, Euser, Bakermans-
Kranenburg, & van Ijzendoorn, 2010). Nor was it inappropriate in the
1980s for this core hypothesis to have been a focus for a time, since
extensive replication was needed in order to establish and, indeed,
substantially qualify the standing of Ainsworth’s empirical claims
(Verhage et al., 2016).
3. The caregiving system
Another criticism of attachment research made by Vicedo which we feel
has a certain purchase, but also limitations, are her claims relating to the
conceptualization of caregiving. In The Nature and Nurture of Love,
Vicedo states that ‘In arguing that the mother is designed to fulﬁll her
child’s instinctual needs Bowlby transformed maternal love and care
from a personal choice entailing devotion, work, patience, dedication,
and not a few renunciations into a natural product of a woman’s
biological constitution’ (2013, p. 90). In our assessment, this criticism
holds well for Bowlby’s popular writings of the 1950s. It does not hold
quite so well for Bowlby’s later thought, and it is a poor characterization
of attachment research over the past decades. The adult caregiving
behavioral system has been theorised as a construct conceptually and
evolutionary distinct from the child attachment system, and as highly
dependent on social support and cultural processes for whether, when
and how they are deployed. And empirical operationalisations of the
concept of caregiver sensitivity explicitly make space for situation-
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speciﬁc and child-related factors rather than prescribing concrete
behaviors.
In ‘Putting attachment in its place’, Vicedo argues that ‘contrary to
what attachment theory considers normative, parents in many commu-
nities try to avoid attaching to their infants right away.’ (2017, p. 693)
Parental avoidance of emotional connection with their infant is certainly
contrary to the normative picture of Child Care and the Growth of Love,
and in the 1950s Bowlby sometimes, confusingly, used the term ‘attach-
ment’ to refer to what he would later distinguish as the caregiving
system. However, Vicedo’s observation is in line with, not contrary to,
attachment theory over the past decades. The idea that parents may use
strategies to modulate the expression of caregiving behaviour, such as
directing attention away from their child if they suspect that the child
could be a source of distress, is well in line with the ideas of Mary Main
and others at least from 1992. As well as theory, there has been empiri-
cal research exploring predictable individual diﬀerences regarding how
children respond to cultural diﬀerences in caregiving sensitivity
(Mesman et al., 2016). One relevant study that Vicedo may be interested
to consider is Mesman et al. (2016b), who found signiﬁcant diﬀerences in
beliefs about the appropriateness of sensitive caregiving between cul-
tural groups. Some of this eﬀect was accounted for by group variations
in poverty.
4. The validity of the ainsworth strange situation
A third set of criticisms made of attachment theory by Vicedo concerns
the validity of the Strange Situation procedure. Vicedo argues that
reliance on the Strange Situation has ‘led developmental psychologists
to a distorted vision of children because it ignored the role of context in
child development.’ (2017, p. 689). Again, Vicedo’s claims have some
relevance but are substantially outdated. It is true that too few attach-
ment researchers include detailed ethnographic observations of natur-
alistic contexts when conducting their research, because there might be
more to discover and grounded hypotheses to be developed.
Nonetheless, there has been substantial study of children’s social con-
texts and how these aﬀect the development of their attachments (e.g.,
Cyr et al., 2010; Sroufe et al. 2005). Furthermore, infant behaviour in the
Strange Situation has repeatedly been found to be associated with
extensive observations of dyadic interactions in naturalistic settings
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(Pederson, Gleason, Moran, & Bento, 1998; True, Pisani, & Oumar, 2001).
Alternative attachment measures such as the Attachment Q-Sort have
been widely used since the 1980s in homes rather than in the strange
situation of the laboratory (Waters & Deane, 1985), but they do not
receive mention by Vicedo.
Another issue of validity raised by Vicedo, and the particular focus of
‘Putting attachment in its place’, is the cross-cultural applicability of attach-
ment theory and methods. The article continues the critique outlined in
The Nature and Nurture of Love, that ‘Whether in a poverty-stricken family
in an African village, in a middle-class suburban American home, or in the
very strange situation of an infant left alone with a stranger in a psycho-
logical laboratory, Ainsworth discerned the same “patterns of attachment
behaviour”.’ (2013, p. 207). However, Vicedo seems unaware that the
phrase ‘patterns of attachment’ changed meaning between the Uganda
ethnography and the Baltimore study. In Infancy in Uganda (1967, p. 332),
Ainsworth writes of ‘diﬀerential crying’ and ‘lifting arms in greeting’ as
examples of patterns of ‘attachment behaviour’. No claim was made that
all children around the world show these behaviours when distressed.
Indeed, Ainsworth’s interest was in the fact that not even all children in
the same family show these behaviours towards their caregiver, and that
changes in family environment altered the likelihood of these behaviours
being displayed. There is an important distinction between discrete beha-
viours and the organization of behaviours (Sroufe & Waters, 1977). The
phrase ‘patterns of attachment’ was later repurposed by Ainsworth to refer
to her classiﬁcations for the Strange Situation, but none of these are based
necessarily on discrete behaviours. An infant can be classiﬁed as secure, for
example, without ever approaching the caregiver or getting in contact; an
infant can be classiﬁed as resistant without a display of anger. Indeed,
these classiﬁcations were labeled A, B, and C by Ainsworth to avoid
premature normative connotations with ‘secure’ or ‘insecure’ attachments.
And later work by various researchers including Hinde, Main and Belsky
emphasized the adaptive role of ‘insecure’ attachments in less than opti-
mal rearing niches.
We know of no passage where Ainsworth stated an expectation that all
infants would ﬁt the three classiﬁcations found in her Baltimore study, and
in a letter to Bowlby of the 10 March 1984 (Bowlby Archive PP/BOW/B.3/8)
she stated explicitly that she was ‘uneasy’ at the very thought, and that
further cross-cultural research would be needed before she would even
take the proposal seriously. She was enthusiastic about cross-cultural
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research, for instance praising the work of her student Bob Marvin and
colleagues for their study with the polymatric Hausa of Nigeria. In an
interview, Ainsworth stated ‘I think that environmental inﬂuences play no
signiﬁcant role in the infant’s basic need for an attachment ﬁgure who can
be trusted. But culture-related diﬀerences in ecologies and expectations
will certainly aﬀect how some speciﬁc aspects of that organization are
expressed’ (Ainsworth & Marvin, 1995, p. 8). Vicedo ‘puts attachment in its
place’ in claiming that attachment researchers have failed to engage with
cross-cultural research, but this claim is only possible because her analysis
stops before the 1990s. She is right that there is need for further cross-
cultural research, and attachment researchers have acknowledged this (e.g.
Mesman et al., 2016). Yet decades of cross-cultural research have demon-
strated the applicability of the Ainsworth classiﬁcations, though not their
exhaustiveness. In ‘Putting attachment in its place’, Vicedo warmly cites
claims that the Strange Situation ‘cannot be used to study children in non-
Western cultures’ (2017, p. 690) but she ignores the large number of
studies, reviewed in the Handbook of Attachment, conducted with the
Strange Situation in a variety of non-WEIRD countries and cultures –
including societies characterized by high levels of alloparenting. Cross-
cultural attachment research does suggest that there are some general
aspects to attachment, but this does not preclude very signiﬁcant culture
speciﬁc responses (Mesman et al., 2016). The relative cross-cultural validity
of a research instrument and the cultural speciﬁcity of the things it seeks to
measure does not represent a contradiction in terms, as Vicedo implies.
Disclosure statement
No potential conﬂict of interest was reported by the authors.
Funding
This work was supported by the Wellcome Trust [WT103343MA].
References
Ainsworth, M. (1967). Infancy in uganda. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press.
Ainsworth, M. D. S., & Marvin, R. S. (1995). On the shaping of attachment theory and
research: An interview with Mary D.S. Ainsworth (Fall 1994). Monographs of the
Society for Research in Child Development, 60(2–3), 3–21.
Bowlby, J. (1953). Child Care and the Growth of Love. Harmondsworth: Pelican.
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 7
Bowlby, J. (1969). Attachment and Loss: Volume 1. Attachment. New York: Basic Books.
Bowlby, J. (1991). Ethological light on psychoanalytic problems. In P. Bateson (Ed.),
The development and integration of behaviour (pp. 301–314). Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Collins, H. (2004). Gravity’s shadow: The search for gravitational waves. NY: Zone.
Cyr, C., Euser, E. M., Bakermans-Kranenburg, M. J., & van Ijzendoorn, M. H. (2010).
Attachment security and disorganization in maltreating and high-risk families.
Development and Psychopathology, 22(1), 87–108.
Dozier, M., Kaufman, J., Kobak, R., O'Connor, T., Sagi-Schwartz, A., Scott, S., ... Zeanah,
C.H. (2014). Consensus statement on group care for children and adolescents.
American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 84, 219–225.
Goossens, F. A., & Ijzendoorn, M. H. (1990). Quality of infants’ attachments to profes-
sional caregivers: Relation to infant-parent attachment and day-care characteris-
tics. Child Development, 61(3), 832–837.
Hrdy, S. B. (2009). Allomothers across Species, across Cultures, and through Time. In
G. Bentley & R. Mace (Eds.), Substitute parents: Biological and social perspectives on
alloparenting in human societies. Oxford: Berghan Books.
Lionetti, F., Pastore, M., & Barone, L. (2015). Attachment in institutionalized children:
A review and meta-analysis. Child Abuse & Neglect, 42, 135–145.
Mead, M. A. (1962). Cultural anthropologist's approach to maternal deprivation. W.H.
O. Public Health Papers, No. 14, 45-62.
Mesman, J., van IJzendoorn, M. H., & Sagi-Schwartz, A. (2016). Cross-cultural patterns
of attachment. In J. Cassidy & P. R. Shaver (Eds.), The handbook of attachment:
Theory, research, and clinical applications (pp. 852–877). New York: The Guilford
Press.
Mesman, J., van IJzendoorn, M., Behrens, K., Carbonell, O. A., Cárcamo, R., Cohen-
Paraira, I., . . . Kondo-Ikemura, K. (2016b). Is the ideal mother a sensitive mother?
International Journal of Behavioral Development, 40(5), 385–397.
Midgley, N. (2014). The nature and nurture of love: From imprinting to attachment in
cold War America. Psychoanalysis & History, 16(2), 266–268.
Mooya, H., Sichimba, F., & Bakermans-Kranenburg, M. (2016). Infant–Mother and
infant–Sibling attachment in Zambia. Attachment & Human Development, 18(6),
618–635.
NICHD Early Child Care Research Network. (1997). The eﬀects of infant child care on
infant-mother attachment security. Child Development, 68(5), 860–879.
Pederson, D. R., Gleason, K., Moran, G., & Bento, S. (1998). Maternal attachment
representations, maternal sensitivity, and the infant–Mother attachment relation-
ship. Developmental Psychology, 34(1998), 925–933.
Plant, R. J. (2015). The nature and nurture of love: From imprinting to attachment in
cold War America by Marga Vicedo. Journal of Social History, 49(2), 456–459.
Pluess, M., & Belsky, J. (2009). Diﬀerential susceptibility to rearing experience: The
case of childcare. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 50(4), 396–404.
Schickore, J., & Steinle, F. (Eds.). (2006). Revisiting discovery and justiﬁcation. NY:
Springer.
8 R. DUSCHINSKY ET AL.
Sroufe, L. A., Egeland, B., Carlson, E. A., & Collins, W. A. (2005). The development of
the person: The minnesota study of risk and adaptation from birth to adulthood.
New York, NY: Guilford Press.
Sroufe, L. A., & Waters, E. (1977). Attachment as an organizational construct. Child
Development, 48, 1184–1199.
True, M., Pisani, L., & Oumar, F. (2001). Infant–Mother attachment among the Dogon
of Mali. Child Development, 72(5), 1451–1466.
Verhage, M. L., Schuengel, C., Madigan, S., Fearon, R. P., Oosterman, M., Cassibba,
R., . . . van Ijzendoorn, M. H. (2016). Narrowing the transmission gap: A synthesis of
three decades of research on intergenerational transmission of attachment.
Psychological Bulletin, 142(4), 337–366.
Vicedo, M. (2013). The nature and nurture of love: From imprinting to attachment in
Cold War America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Vicedo, M. (2017). Putting attachment in its place: disciplinary and cultural contexts.
European Journal Of Developmental Psychology, 6(14), 684-699.
Waters, E., & Deane, K. E. (1985). Deﬁning and assessing individual diﬀerences in
attachment relationships. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child
Development, 50(1/2), 41–65.
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 9
